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"And are you stronger than all these? for if not. 
You will have to remain where you are. 
May there not be the alternative, I said. that 
We may persuade you to let us go? 
But can you persuade us, if we refuse to listen 
To you? he said. 
Certainly not. replied Glaucon. 
Then we are not going to listen; of lhat you may be assured.1 
Mrs. Fool allows that the non-hypothetical use of shouldm is 'correctly main­
rained and adequately supported,' independent of the agent's desires or interests, if 
the right kind of thing can be shown about the nature of che action - even when 
special circumstances justifying the ends mentioned are not required. "What is not 
necessary", she says. "is that we should show a connexion with the agent's desires or 
in1erescs if we are correctly to maintain our use of 'should'; so that we have here a 
non-hypothetical' use of the word.'' 
Now she claims that such non-hypothetical usage can also be found in nonmoral 
contexts. Though this may be true. I do noc think that Mrs. Foot has shown the 
nonmoral contexts in which she thinks it also operates. In fact, I doubt whether one 
can correctly maintain and adequately support the non-hypothetical use of 'should' 
in the context of club rules or rules of etiquette.2 
Let us consider Mrs. Foot's full description of the non-hypothetical use of 
shouldm . She allows that for the non·hypothetical use or sbould m , "where a moral 
ground is suggested as the reason why something should be done, we may say chat a 
man should 11> without the implication that ., -ing stands in an ancillary relation to 
his desires or interests." It may, or course, but it is not necessary. We may, for 
example, suppose thal others care about the moral ends she mentions. But even 1/ 
others do 1101 care about such ends, the shouldm is correctly maintained and 
"adequately supported if the right kind of thing can be shown about the nature of 
the action." 
Tf I read Mrs. Foot correctly, the full description of the 'adequately supported 
and correctly maintained' non-hypothetical use of shouldm is as follows: "What is 
not necessary is that we should show a connexion with the agent's (or anyone else's) 
desires or intere..c;ts if we are to correctly maintain our use of shouldm ." 
What I wish to show is that either the non-hypothetical use of shoulde 3 is not 
analogous to the shouldm . or that the shoulde is, to use Beck's language. a 
conditionnl categorical 'should' or an elliptical expression of a hypothetical 
'should'.' Clearly Mrs. Foot is correct in saying that sbould e does not fail to apply 
to one e'en if he sensibly decides to ignore it. If w e  are correctly to maintain our 
use of shoulde. it must also stand supported even when there exists no connection 
with the agent's desires or interests. But whether or not the agent sensibly decides 
to ignore the shoulde. it's non-hypothetical use is not analogous to that of should m . 
For them to be analogous, for the argument to do what Foot sets it up to do, the 
non-hypothetical should e must also stand supported even when there exists no 
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connection with the agent's, or anyone's, desire or interest - as long as the right 
kind of thing can be shown about the nature of the action. 
Now it Wtluld be silly and .senseless in the absence of 3nyone's desires or interests 
10 say that the shoulde provides us with reasons for acting when enunciated as e.g. 
in ·r o\'itations in Lhe thlrd person should be answered in the third person' or 'Ladies 
should noL be brought into the smoking room'. If no one's desires or interests were 
related to these rules it would be silly and senseless to follow them. It is not at all 
clear what we could say or do in such cases to show the right kind of thing about the 
narnre of the action. 
Therefore. and here I too merely wish to elucidate and not ad,·ocate. it appears 
tha1 the non-hypothetical use of shouldm may be correccly maintained and 
adequately supported (for Lhe reasons Foot rnentions) witholllt being silly or sense­
less, independent of anyones desires or interests. while Lhe non-hypothetical use 
of shouldecannot stand supported. \\ithout being silly or senseless. independent of 
anyones desires or interests. These examples fail to show that the importance of 
the should m can easily be overestimated in ethics. It seems rather that our non­
hypothetical use of shouldm is important, or at least not silly or senseless. while the 
shoulde is both not important. and silly or senseless. 
What of the second so-called 'reason-giving' non-hypothetical use of should m ?  
Here is wouJd seem impossible to disagree with Mrs. Foot. for this use of should m 
amounts to either 'no reason has been given' o:r that moral considerations 'just do' 
give reasons for acting. Certainly one may say the same with equal gratuitousness 
about the shoulde . 
Let us consider Foot's dilemma. I agree that we do not "create reasons for acting 
simply by putting together any silly rules and introducing a non-hypothetical 
'should'." I also agree thait the ''non-hypothetical 'should' does not necessarily imply 
reasons for acting." This does not, of course, aipply to all non-hypothetical uses of 
should m .  For Lhe first use of the non-hypothetical should m may be 'adequately 
supported· where a moral ground is supplied as the reason for acting and the right 
kind of thing can be shown about the nature of the action. The same thing cannot 
be said about the non-hypothetical use of shoulde . 
Perhaps here we should introduce another 'non-hypothetical' use of 'should', the 
gratuitous use ()f 'should'. The shouldg . in any context, by definition, gives no 
reasons for acting. Here we must agree with Foot. if the shouldm is used as the 
should 9 . there are no reasons to give, nothing to be proved. 
Let us turn to the firstl sense 1n which a moral system might be said to consist 
entirely of hypothetical imperatives. In this sense the hypothetical should m applies 
"only in case the right connexion could be found with the agent's interests or 
desires." The hypothetical shouldm operates only for members of the group which 
share common aims, so that if others outside the group do not care about the ends 
of morality they have no moral reason to refrain from stealing, rape, murder, and 
the like. Yet Foot maintains that we could change to a hypothetical use of should m 
"without destroying or even disrupting morality". And "that it would not matter at 
ull if we made this change in our usage" - unless of course we have "pure in­
tuitions" about morality. Since we don't, our only loss. Foot claims, is ''one among 
our many instruments for expressing a hostile attitude to persons outside the moral 
group". I n  this hypothetical use of shouldm . we could no longer say that others 
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lf Foot is right about this. i t  is  not a loss but a gain. Clearly, if the non­
hypothctical use of shouldm were only a device for expressing hostility - it could 
not sen e as a moral reason for acting. In this sense. the indifferent amoral man may 
see the matter more clearly than we do, and, if so, may in fact also be a man of 
courage. For if our 'reason' for saying, non-hypothetically, that he should m not 0 
arc merely devices for expressing hostility, then indeed, he has good reason not to 
be moral. 
But I think Foot makes too much out of the indifferent amoral man. He is not a 
gauge or monltor for reasons for acting in either the moral or non· moral context of 
the non·hypot hetical or the hypothetical use of should m . This man does not care 
whether he offends or does not offend someone else, and to say that we don't care 
whether we do or do not offend, is surely not to provide a reason for offending or a 
reason for not offending. Such a man has no reason to e nor has he a reason not to 
e 
Similarly. the indifferent amoral man has no moral reason to regard the rights of 
others, nor does he have reason to disregard them. Foot is correct; this man ha.� no 
rea.�on to behave moralJy. But it also follows that he has no reason to behave im· 
morally: neither 'Hurt others' nor 'Help others' will provide a reason for his acting. 
What a c;irange case. We are unable to provide any reason for acting, moral or 
immoral. hypothetical or non-hypothetical. H we cannot find the right connection 
with this man ·s interests or desires. we cannot mothate him or provide him with 
reasons for acting: if he is apathetic. if it is a matter of indifference whether he 
offends or not, again we cannot provide him with reasons for acting. He should 
hardly be our test case, or a monitor for detenninang whether certain uses of 
'should' may or may not provide re3sons for acting. 
In the second sense of our hypothetical shouldm . the agent has :reason for acting 
when and only when moral considerations are related Lo his desires or interests. 
Foot thinks that it may seem extraordinary that such a man may have a 'good will,' 
possess every 'irtue and have moral principles. In fact, it is not at all extraordinary; 
it is a very compelling conception of a moral man. I t  is so disarming, that even Kant 
might pause. and concede wilh Foot that such a man may be all that she claims he 
is. In fact, it may make us all non-categorical moralists. 
Jn this system. practical reasoning, consisting only of hypothetical shouldm , the 
agent is a man of resolution and self-disciplinc.s Such a man may want. "and want 
more than anything in the world, lo help other people; and his hypothetical im· 
pcrati,es wall then relate to such ends." This man could have alJ the virtues; where 
they are not defined by their relation to an end. this agent, having engaged in his 
de�ire·dependent practical reasoning. m ight belie' e that "rules of honesty and 
justice were important for the common good and the protection of the weak, about 
"htch he cared." lo addition, he wanted "to live openly and in good faith with his 
r.eighbors and lhcrefore refused dishonesty and injustice even where it  seemed 
po�ible to conceal these things and nuJlify their bad effects." 
If we substitute throughout for may want' and 'might belie ve' such expressions as 
'wanted', 'does m fact have' or 'helievt>'; and odd, as Foot does, that 
thL'I agent's desire-dependent practical reasoning is "in conformity with virtue not 
contingently but as directed to the ends internal to the virtue concerned", why 
indeed would we deny virtue to such a man? And further, this agent does not want 
another's happiness merely for the sake of his own. nor does he want to be honest 
155 
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because it is lhe best policy; rather be simply wants another person's happine�. and 
he wants to be honest because of the importance of honesty in the life or the 
community, and on account of his concern for the common good. 
Indeed Kant himself must rejoice, for his theory of human nature rests on a false 
premise; and for the army of volunteers, which Foot describes so well, we have 
discovered "just that set of ends which would give true virtue rather than accidental 
conformity." 
Having abandoned Kant's theory of human action, we are now presented with a 
"set of ends which would give true virtue rather than accidental conformity." Why, 
indeed. should we deny virtue to one whose desires are in conformity with virtue 
not co11ti11gently but as directed to the ends i11ternal to the virtue concerned. as is 
so well put by FoOL? Here, though they may provide 'incentive' it is not desires and 
interests which constitute the determining ground of an action. It is the ends in­
ternal to the virtue concerned when related to the agent's interests and desires. To 
put it different!;,:. it is the ends considered inllernal to virtue that make these ends 
morally desirable not the desiring of these ends that make them morally desirable. 
If so. then these ends may be considered, and sometimes are considered as 
desirable independent of the agent's desires or interests. The interests and desires 
of this agent appear co be purely moral; his actions are self-imposed and endorsed 
by hi� own desire-dependent practical reasoning: we might even say that his 
concern and care exhibit reverence and respect for the ends of moraliry. Though 
the question whether his maxims are capable of becoming laws does not arise, he 
subjects himself to no other 'will' but his own. Though. I suspect, if we push this too 
Car we would have a non-hypothetical use of 'should'. 
Even from Foot's view, ethics does not appear as merely an elaboration of human 
psychology. One's desires and interests are non-contingently directed and in­
timately bound up with the requirements of the ends of morality itself; e.g. such a 
moral agent desires perhaps more than anything else, to do what is right as such. 
Even here it would not be correct to say that interests and desires do not meet the 
conditions of inescapability which attach to the criteria of morality. For it is not the 
desire or interest which provides the moral support, though these would be, on 
Foot's view, necessary conditions of the motivational source of practical action. 
Kant himself admits that love, for example, as an affection ('pathological love') 
cannot be a command of duty. In one place, h,e says that "Consequently, the law . . .  
does not command the action itself . . . "6 There is then some question whether, 
according to Kant, we have a duty to adopt our reverent respect for the moral law 
as our sufficient incentive for obeying the universali1,ability·requirement of the law. 
So we can have no dury to adopt the ends of morality, since we can never _know if 
our interest is exclusively based on reverent respect for the moral law; as such, we 
cannot, of course, be obligated to make certain that we motivate ourselves by such 
an interest. The 'disposition' of Foot's agent to e is already moral. His vi rtuousness 
has already developed to a high degree. Foot's agent is not so much striving for 
'purity of heart' but is one, considering his concerns, whose character already 
constitutes 'purity of heart.' 
A person may even believe that these moral ends are desirable, and yet not have 
any interest or desire to do what is right. So though aU pas.sional or motivational 
considerations involve desires and interests, the ends themselves are open to 
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dependent, are specifically moral. Now is it because these reasons constitute moral 
requirements that they motivate us to act, and if so, lo raise a broader question, 
then is it true that morality would not be disrupted if it consisted only of 
hypothetical 'shoulds' in lhe first sense, so that these moral ends when independent 
of our desires or interests cannot mocivate us to act? Would we have lost only one 
of our de' ices for expressing hostility? 
The major disagreement here is that Foot. contra Kant, denies that moral ends 
are ends that the agent has a duty to adopt. Though I, in part, agree with Foot, it is 
difficult to see what is paradoxical about this view as she presents it. Foot's position 
is the one that appears paradoxical. I may do my duty, independent of desire or 
interest, simply because it is my duty -as a teacher, doctor or policeman; but I do 
not have a duty, qua duty, to become a teacher, doctor or policeman. I may have, 
as Foot would allow, duties within morality, but I cannot have a duty to adopt the 
ends of morality, or the ends which substantively define morality. It may not be 
good Kantian exegesis. but one may say that the "spirit of Kant" is preserved if we 
consider his fundamental theme within the context of "a community, every 
member of which is respected by all others, and in which only those rules of 
conduct are followed which everyone recognizes to be reasonable." 7 As a member 
of that community, my actions do not exhibit blind obedience to the commands of 
duty. Moreover, here, though we may have no argument for non-members, we have 
very powerful arguments for those who might waver, or for those who seek 
justification for their participation. We cannot have it both ways. We cannot justify 
not paying our taxes and ar the same time claim that we have a right to participate 
and share in what tax money provides. So whatever my desires or interests, I cannot 
justify not adopting the ends of morality of the above community and claim that I 
also have a right to participate and share in whatever benefits morality may afford_ 
Let us look at the free floating, unsubscripted 'ought' in 'One ought to be moral'. 
Surely Foot is right; it is not clear just what is being said here. It seems to make no 
sense unless the 'ought' has 1he moral subscript. giving a tautology, or relates 
morality to non-moral systems. This is not an argument against any system, moral 
or non-moral, in which such an 'ought' operates. This 'ought' would be like the 
'should9 ', the gratuitous 'should'. Here too, when the ought9 is issued, the un­
caring, amoral man, or any man for that matter, has no reason for acting morally; 
or immorally, or non-morally. This ought does not ride shotgun over the moral or 
the non-moral point of view. Just what does it mean? 
Foot's case is odd. When the 'ought' is subscripted, it still cannot provide reasons 
for acting for the uncaring, amoral man. U such a man is indifferent to the suffering 
of others, then he has no moral reason to act in order to relieve their suffering. But 
such a man is amoral. not immoral, and as such, though he has no moral ends which 
require regard for others, he has no ends which require disregard of others, i.e_ 
which require that he behave immorally. This is a paradoxical view: subscripted or 
unsubscripted. the 'ought', for such a man, would provide no reason for action in 
any context - moral, immoral. or non-moral. And if we take the 'One ought to be 
moral' to mean 'One ought to adopt the ends of morality, the ends which define 
morality', we cannot appeal to those ends within morality without begging the 
question or uttering a tautology. Similarly for club rules or rules of etiquette, either 
we beg the "question or issue: a tautology. 
Let us now turn to the issue which may indeed make Kantians of us all. When it 
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comes lo appraising moral character, no one can contract out of morality; morality 
is inescapable. Since the rules of etiquette are not Kantian categorical imperatives, 
we must explain what, if any, additional inescapability belongs to morality. What 
then are we to say about the categorical use of ought m amd the oughte ? Perhaps 
we can show that more concessions have been made to Kant, in regard to the 
inescapabil ity of morality, than Foot allows. We can at least show that the 
inescapability of morality is quite unlike the inescapability of etiquette and that the 
central difference is precisely that the two do not have an analogous status. It can 
at least be shown that men, whatever their desires, may have the best reasons to act 
morally. This is not to say or to reduce moral considerations to considerati<;>ns of 
reason where "one has reason to do what iit is rational to do;" but that there are 
numerous reasons, moral and non-moral, why one ought to be moral . They will be 
complex and overlapping reasons; they will not serve to prove or demonstrate, but 
neither will they serve to merely express our feelings; hopefully they will exhibit or 
reveal a reasonable and well-founded case for being moral if certain other 
questions are first raised. 
Let us indicate the additional inescapability of morality by contrasting and 
exhibiting the difference between the shouldm and the shoulde . Clearly questions 
in regard to the kind of person one wants to be, the kind of life one wants to live are 
more fundamental and significant than the social forms of decorum which may or 
may not be sensibly denied. It is largely arbitrary (and may be senseless or at least 
silly) whether or not one answer in the third person, invitations sent in the third 
person; or whether one uses a fork or spoon for eating peas; or to remain seated or 
standing when the !hostess approaches the table. These things may easily be 
changed; any rule or set of rules enabling us to get along in certain ways will do. If 
these rules are not connected to anyone's desires or interests, they seem to be 
simply senseless. If tlhey are so related, one may even sensibly ignore them; and 
though he may be unmannerly, may have morally redeeming reasons for acting in 
such a way, but the man who ignores the suffering and needs of others cannot be 
redeemed by appeal t o  the rules of etiquette (when these ar,e non-moral). 
When there are disagreements about the shouldm and about the shoulde , the 
additional inescapability of morality is more apparent; moral considerations are 
seen as more fundamental and significant. Consider two cases: 
l. (a) The hostess thought that I was rude or at least unmannerly because I sat 
before she was seated; (b) I sat before the hostess was seated, but she did not think 
that I was rude or unmannerly, for she thought these social amenities were silly. 
II. (a) The hostess thought I was cruel, breaking the child's arm because in 
reaching for the bread, he did not ask for permission; (b) I broke the child's arm, 
but the hostess did not think I was cruel, for she thought the rules of morality were 
silJy. 
In the former case, the rules may or may not apply. They can be sensibly ignored. 
In the former sort of case, it may be right to 9S , or it may be a matter of complete 
indifference if no one cares about these things. In the latter kind of case it is wrong 
to fO ,  and the man is a brute if IO-ing is done dispassionately, wicked and depraved 
if S1-ing is done with pleasure. 
ln support of Kann, though not for Kant's reasons, the things we say about the 
should m cannot be said about the shoulde . . .  in fact, in the second case we may 
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certainly ask if the man is rational, i.e., does he know what he is doing, is he 
responsible for his actions? Perhaps he is rational, as he is surely inhumane. Some 
persons' feelings may be hurt if one violates 1he rnles or etiquette: one may expect 
1ha1 price and remain a morally good man. To violate the rules of morali1y may 
render one unfit and cost one the right to live ia most forms of human society; he 
may have to contract out of human society. 
Let us now relate the inescapability of morality with 'One ought to be moral', 
morally subscripted, addressed to men who are not wholly indifferent, though they 
may be amoral or pc:rhaps immoral. I am not trying lo invest human psychology 
with the requirements of logic. And it is no1 tautologous nor unreasonable 10 say 
1hat 'One ought to be moral' because of what it means to be moral. Reason here 
would be 1ied up with all sorts of considerations. We can grant that for many of us 
there is, at limes, an insensitivity and blindness concerning the results of actions 
performed indifferently which questions such as 'Do you realize what you are 
doing?,' 'How would you like it if . . .  ?' or 'What if everyone . . .  ?,' may help us 
remove. and in so far as they do. they are germane to any moral (though not only 
moral) argument. In the 'One ought to be moral' sentence, in regard to the ends of 
morality - viz. concern over human suffering , cruelty, or human worth -
literature. poetry. and the cinema. are perhaps better means than cool argument to 
help us to realize more concretely the effects of our actions and, the social situation 
of which we are a part. (We have already seen that one cannot have ic both ways.) 
Although in 1his sense. lhc question "Would you want everyone lo behave'. . .  ?.' has 
no O\ erriding importance in making us come to realize these things; the above 
devices provide more vivid ways of getting us to imagine what it would be like to 
ignore morality. Appeals to reason, or name-calling, where compassion is absent, is 
both silly and useless, though compassion is not enough either. Although, as K. 
Nielsen forct!fully argues. Hobbes does. to transport the question, adequately 
answer the 'Why should we be moral?' question, he does not answer the 'Why 
should I be moral?' question.8 We could say, e.g. to be fully amoral is to be less 
than a man; to be fully immoral is to be both wicked and depraved . In either case. if 
our agents are not mindless, and if they do not refuse to listen, we may rationally 
motivate !hem to be moral by revealing in bold relief the agent's conception of 
himself. If we can reveal what reasons the agent has for doing things for himself, we 
may get him to see what reasons others have for doing things for him, and what 
reasons he has for doing things for others. This is not to separate ethical from 
moti\'ational considerations. Though the two may operate independently they 
complexly overlap. 
It is not merely that a man is 'dishonest,' 'unjust' and 'uncharitable,' it is dHficult 
to sec that such vices are tied up with the well·being of anyone. We want to be the 
best that we can become and although we must struggle alone here, we are alone as 
men. our ha1ard, as members or a human community. is that we may indeed 
contract out of such a community, become brutes, unfit, less than men. And 
perhaps moral inescapability enters and operates best when such men are wronged 
or belie\'e that they are wronged. 
Consider the following: 
"After l returned to prison, I took a long look at myself and, for the first time in 
my life, admilled Lhat I was wrong, that I had gone astray - astray not so much 
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from the while man's law as from being human, civi lized - for 1 could not approve 
the act of rape. E'en though I had some insight into my owo motivations, I did not 
feel justified. T lost my self ·respect. My pride as a man dissolved . . .  
I realized that no one could save me but myself. The prison authorities were both 
uninterested and unable to help me. I had to seek out the truth and unravel the 
snarled web of my motivations. I had to find out who I am and what I want to be. 
what type of man I should be. and what I could do to become the best of which I 
was capable . . .  
H I had followed the course laid down for me by the officials, I would un· 
doubtedly have long since been out of prison - but I'd be less of a man. rd be 
weaker and less certain of where I want to go, what 1 want to do, and how to go 
about it. 
The price of hating other human beings is loving oneself le:ss."9 
There is no blind obedience to duty here; the above may even exhibit a rational 
and autonomous basis for morality. What flags are being raised here? Who is being 
duped? The above is surely in line with the spirit10 of Kant; 'A community, every 
member of which is respected by all the others', because of the questions raised, 
and because of what one is trying to be; 'and in which onlY, those rules of conduct 
are followed which everyone recognizes lo be reasonable' 'Who am I?', 'What do I 
�ant to be?' 'What type of man I should be. and what I could cto to become the best 
of which 1 was capabfo.' 
Why can't a man contract out or morality? The inescapabillty of morality is not 
to be round only in appraisals of the moral character of others, as a device for 
expressing our hostility; but as a genuine concern with what the other is doing (not 
only to us) but to himself. I am not sure what it means to prove or look for the rrutb 
in such contexts; if we differ, the flag need not be dropped. for we require that our 
differences be well-founded and reasonable. 
Perhaps there will be less fear of being tricked if we start here: the question 'How 
can we make ourselves better?' should be one of the first questions reflective men 
should occempt lo answer. Here not only moral questions but much broader 
questions of character are raised. The question whether we have a duty to be moral 
requires broader treatment than appeal to any specific moral theory. Surely if the 
dimensions of human existence are reduced lo moral character alone as the most 
importalll and worthwhile, we suffer a loss. We want to become the best of all we 
arc capable of becoming. Morality is a part and an important part, but only a part, 
of these considerations; and why should we deny these concerns as fundamental 
themes of rational human nature. 
FOOTNOTES 
I. REPUBL.IC, Bk I 
,, Thou9h such a use may be maintained if these rules border or ftnd to merge with moral considerations. 
That though 1S a d1tferenl issue 
3 ·e I shall use indlfferenlly. to mean either rules of etique11e or club rules where these are non moral . 
.: L w Beck, 'Apodlctic Imperatives', KANT-STUOIEN, X·XI (1957) pp 7 ,, 
5. A morality of inclination as Foot puts it, would not get off the ground, nor loMed get us out of bed In the 
morning 
6 T K Abboll in KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL. REASON ANO OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY 
OF ETHICS, 6th edn (L.onaman's. London. 1959) D. 303. 
, H 8 Achon in KANT'S MORAL PHIL.OSOPHY. CSI. Martin's Press, 19701 pp. 43 u 
8 K Nielsen, "Why Should I be Moral?" METHODS. xv N0. 59� (1963) pp. 275 306. 
9 E.Cteever,SOUL.ON ICE,(Oetl, 1968) pp. 15-17 
10 ThOUgh. as one philosopher puts ii, a 'de-mythologised' version oi Kant. K Ward, "Review of Kant's Moral 
Philosophy", by H 8 Acton, PHILOSOPHICAL BOOKS. Vol. X I I  No 1 (Jan., 1971) pp 1 2. 
160 9
Gilbert: Foot-Notes
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1971
